T he biological science community plays a vital role in thwarting bioterrorism. By improving our understanding of pathogens and of the mechanisms by which they cause disease, and by developing diagnostics, therapeutics, preventatives, and other countermeasures, researchers will reduce the likelihood and the consequences of biological attack. At the same time, scientific research also creates risks. Pathogens used in research facilities may be a source of biological agents for terrorists. Moreover, our expanding understanding of the processes of life could be subverted to develop ever-new biological weapons. Responsible conduct of biological science requires the research community to work with the law enforcement, national security, health, and other communities to reduce these risks in ways that preserve the independence, robustness, and vitality of our research enterprise.
Legal and physical controls on pathogens
In the last five years, Congress has tightened controls over potentially dangerous biological agents. Since 1997, select agents-pathogens or toxins designated by the secretary of health and human services as having the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety-may be transferred only between registered institutions. Since September 11, Congress has prohibited possession of select agents by felons and certain other categories of individuals, and it banned altogether the possession of biological agents, outside their natural environment, that are "not reasonably justified by a prophylactic, protective, bona fide research, or other peaceful purpose" (P. L. 107-56, sec. 817). Additional measures are being considered that would regulate and register possession of select agents used for legitimate purposes; the secretary of health and human services would be required to establish standards for the handling and use of those agents. If sensibly implemented, such measures can provide assurance that dangerous materials are being handled responsibly. Moreover, these measures can impede access to such agents by would-be terrorists who lack the skills, resources, or patience to exploit natural sources of dangerous agents. However, excessive restrictions impose costs that are disproportionate to their security benefits. Setting the appropriate balance will require the scientific community and other interested parties to work together.
Governance of contentious research
A tougher conceptual problem for the scientific and policy communities is what might be called "contentious" research-research that, because it has immediate weapons applications, raises questions as to how, or even whether, it should be conducted. Biological science, of course, is not unique in having the potential to harm as well as to advance human welfare. However, the stakes in biology may be higher. Unleashing a highly contagious, highly lethal biological agent would be an unparalleled disaster. Moreover, the journey from a laboratory to such a calamitous outcome could be shorter, and less outwardly visible, in biology than in almost any other field. In addition, future biological weapons could be more subtle and insidious than existing infectious diseases. The more that science learns about the processes that underlie human health, human behavior, and even human consciousness, the greater the possibility that those processes could be tampered with or subverted.
These frightening possibilities challenge us to explore mechanisms for the governance of fundamental biological and biomedical research. Although they could be seen as infringing upon the freedom of scientific inquiry, such measures are not without precedent. At the Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA, convened by the National Academy of Sciences in 1975, pioneers in the emerging field of recombinant DNA technology called for a voluntary moratorium on certain genetic engineering techniques until a regime could be developed to guard against dangerous accidental or unforeseen consequences of this new technology. Today, additional measures may be needed to guard against the intentional abuse of biological science-a threat that the Asilomar process did not set out to address.
A governance regime could include one or more of the following elements:
• Constraint. Should any of these questions be answered affirmatively, implementation will pose serious challenges. Yet the scientific community has an obligation to work with other groups to give these mechanisms serious consideration. If all parties are able to engage in a wellconsidered, deliberative process, they are most likely to arrive at an outcome that all can accept-even if, in the end, they are unable to agree upon new governance measures. If, on the other
